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Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
332 State Capitol 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
Re: State of Utah v. Perank, 
Supreme Court No, 
Priority 2 
860243 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
This letter is written pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court to bring supplemental authorities to 
the Court's attention. 
In the last paragraph on page 5 of 
assert that the Utah Supreme Court "has 
on reservation status," despite the ruli 
Court of Appeals. We cite several dises 
state courts disagreed with the federal 
Indian reservations—which disagreement, 
in United States Supreme Court review of 
still firmly believe the position set fo 
correct, we have recently discovered an 
decision we feel, in all candor, should 
attention. 
the State's brief, we 
a right to its own view 
ng of the Tenth Circuit 
tablishment cases where 
courts on the status of 
in some cases, resulted 
the dispute. While we 
rth in our brief to be 
old Utah Supreme Court 
be brought to the Court's 
That case is Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles & S.L.R., 52 Utah 
116, 172 P. 725 (1918), an action by a railroad employee for 
injuries he sustained while working on railroad equipment. He 
based his action on the Federal Employers1 Liability Act. In 
order to recover under the federal act, it was necessary to show 
that both the employer and the employee were engaged in inter-
state commerce at the time of the accident. While plaintiff 
offered some evidence on the interstate commerce issue, the 
defendant railroad company simply relied on a New Jersey Supreme 
Court decision to sustain its contention that at the time of the 
accident the parties were not engaged in interstate commerce. 
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The Utah Supreme Court chose to disregard the state court 
decision, and without discussion held that a federal circuit 
court decision to the contrary was controlling, since this was an 
issue on which the federal courts have the ultimate right to 
speak. The Court ruled that where such a conflict existed, a 
state court had a duty to follow the federal court decision (172 
P. at 727). However, it is unclear whether the Utah Court!s 
ruling was based purely on the federal decision or on the fact 
that plaintiff had offered some evidence on the issue and the 
jury had found as a matter of fact that interstate commerce was 
present. 
While we donft think it does, Kuchenmeister could arguably 
stand for the proposition that a state court is bound by the 
decision of a lower federal court—as opposed to the United 
States Supreme Court—on matters of federal law. However, we do 
not believe Kuchenmeister detracts from the proposition that this 
Court is entitled to its own view of the status of the Uintah 
Valley Reservation for the following reasons: 
1. The Court's conclusion in Kuchenmeister was made without 
any comment or analysis. There is nothing to indicate that the 
statement of the Court was one of a general application versus 
being fact specific. Further, as far as we can tell, the rele-
vant language of Kuchenmeister has not been cited or relied upon 
in any Utah Supreme Court decision since the case was handed 
down in 1918, and is contrary to the great weight of authority. 
For example, in U.S. v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970), the 
Court held that while a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on 
federal law has a binding effect on all courts (state or fed-
eral), the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal exercise no super-
visory jurisdiction over state tribunals and their decisions are 
not binding on state courts, even as to matters of federal law 
(432 F.2d at 1075-1076). In accord see: People v., Luros, 480 
P.2d 633 (Cal. 1971); State v. Harmon, 685 P.2d 814, 817 (Ida. 
1984); In re Sinclair, 640 P.2d 918, 920 (Mont. 1982); Bargas v. 
Warden, 482 P.2d 317, 318 (Nev. 1971); and First Wyoming Bank v. 
Trans-Mountain Sales & Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219, 1225 (Wyo. 
1979). 
2. In the case at bar, Appellant directly challenged the 
District Courtfs jurisdiction. Since that determination depends 
on the status of the reservation boundaries, the Utah Courts are 
entitled to make their own jurisdictional determination. 
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In conclusion, we do not believe Kuchenmeister detracts from 
the proposition that this Court, in the context of this case, is 
entitled to its own view on the status of the reservation; but we 
nevertheless thought it appropriate to bring this case to the 
Court!s attention. 
Respectfully youi/s, 
MICHAEL VK^S^W^J 
Assistant A t t o ^ y General 
cc: Kirk C. Bennett 
Attorney for Appellant 
cc: Stephen G. Boyden 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae Ute Indian Tribe 
cc: Tom D. Tobin 
Alvin G. Nash 
Herbert W. Gillespie 
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Duchesne and 
Uintah Counties 
MMQ/jr 
